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Brexiting CMS 	
Abstract Brexit	could	be	seen	as	the	largest	popular	rebellion	against	the	power	elites	in	the	UK	modern	history.	It	is	also	part	of	a	larger	phenomenon	–	the	resurgence	of	nationalism	and	right-wing	politics	within	Europe,	the	United	States	and	beyond.	Bringing	in	its	wake	the	worrying	manifestations	of	racism,	xenophobia	and	anti-intellectualism,	Brexit	and	its	consequences	should	be	a	core	concern	for	Critical	Management	Studies	academics	in	helping	to	shape	post-Brexit	societies,	organisations	and	workplaces,	and	in	fighting	and	challenging	the	sinister	forces	that	permeate	them.	In	this	paper,	we	consider	how	CMS	can	rise	to	the	challenges	and	possibilities	of	this	‘phenomenon-in-the-making’.	We	reflect	on	the	intellectual	tools	available	to	CMS	researchers	and	the	ways	in	which	they	may	be	suited	to	this	task.	In	particular,	we	explore	how	the	key	positions	of	anti-performativity,	critical	performativity,	political	performativity,	and	public	CMS	can	be	used	as	a	starting	point	for	thinking	about	the	potential	relevance	of	CMS	in	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	contexts.	Our	intention	is	to	encourage	CMS-ers	to	contribute	positively	to	the	post-Brexit	world	in	academic	as	well	as	personal	capacities.	For	this,	we	argue	that	a	new	public	CMS	is	needed,	which	would	1)	be	guided	by	the	premise	that	we	have	no	greater	and	no	lesser	right	than	anyone	else	to	shape	the	world,	2)	entail	as	much	critical	reflexivity	in	relation	to	our	unintended	performativities	as	our	intended	ones,	and	3)	be	underpinned	by	marginalism	as	a	critical	political	project.		
Keywords:	Brexit,	populism,	racism,	anti-intellectualism,	public	CMS,	marginalism,	unintended	performativity.	
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Introduction	Brexit	is	a	complex	and	contradictory	phenomenon-in-the-making,	capable	of	transforming	social,	economic,	political,	legal,	cultural	and	organisational	norms	not	only	within	the	UK	but	also	on	the	broader	international	stage.	Bringing	together	unlikely	allies	(from	Lexiteers	to	proponents	of	the	far	right)	and	further	dividing	established	groups	and	parties,	it	involves	a	broad	spectrum	of	supporters	and	opposition	(Davidson,	2017).	As	media	reports	and	emerging	academic	commentaries	struggle	to	make	sense	of	this	complexity,	several	themes	begin	to	unfold.	Firstly,	Brexit	could	be	seen	as	the	largest	popular	rebellion	against	the	power	elites	in	the	UK	modern	history.	Secondly,	political	complexity	notwithstanding,	it	is	linked	to	the	larger	phenomenon	of	the	resurgence	of	nationalism	and	right-wing	politics	within	Europe,	the	United	States	and	beyond.	Thirdly,	at	least	some	of	the	events	preceding	and	subsequent	to	the	Brexit	vote,	such	as	the	increased	manifestations	of	racism,	xenophobia	and	anti-intellectualism,	are	deeply	worrying	and	require	urgent	critical	scrutiny	and	opposition.		In	this	paper,	based	on	the	above	points	we	argue	that	Brexit	should	be	a	core	concern	for	Critical	Management	Studies	academics	in	helping	to	shape	post-Brexit	societies,	organisations	and	workplaces,	and	in	fighting	and	challenging	the	sinister	forces	that	permeate	them.	Following	a	brief	overview	of	the	background	and	unfolding	consequences	of	the	Brexit	vote,	we	consider	how	CMS	can	interrogate	the	challenges	and	possibilities	of	this	phenomenon-in-the-making.	In	so	doing,	we	reflect	on	the	intellectual	tools	available	to	CMS	researchers	and	the	ways	in	which	they	may	be	suited	to	this	task.	In	particular,	we	explore	how	the	key	positions	of	anti-performativity,	critical	performativity,	political	performativity,	and	public	CMS	can	be	used	as	a	starting	point	for	thinking	about	the	potential	relevance	of	CMS	in	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	contexts.	Our	intention	is	to	encourage	a	wide	spectrum	of	CMS-ers	to	contribute	positively	to	shaping	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	worlds	in	academic	as	well	as	personal	capacities.	For	this,	we	argue	that	a	new	public	CMS	is	needed,	which	would	be	guided	by	the	premise	that	we	have	as	much	and	as	little	right	as	anyone	else	to	shape	the	world,	entail	critical	reflexivity	in	relation	to	our	unintended	as	well	as	intended	performativities,	and	be	underpinned	by	marginalism	as	a	critical	political	project.	
Background	and	Consequences	On	the	23rd	of	June	2016	the	electorate	of	the	United	Kingdom	voted	by	a	slim	majority	to	leave	the	European	Union,	setting	the	course	for	what	has	become	known	as	‘Brexit’.	However,	Scotland,	Northern	Ireland,	London	and	most	metropolitan	areas	voted	to	remain.	This	momentous	event	has	been	called	the	largest	popular	rebellion	against	‘the	establishment’	(in	the	broad	sense	of	‘power	elites’)	within	the	UK	in	modern	history.	In	particular,	it	has	been	described	as	a	dramatic	(and	traumatic)	comeback	of	those	
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groups	and	sections	of	the	population	most	affected	(and	disaffected)	by	the	worst	of	the	austerity	measures	(Wahl,	2016;	Worth,	2016)	instituted	in	pursuit	of	neoliberal	ideals	of	market	fundamentalism	(Pettifor,	2016).	The	shock	waves	generated	by	Brexit	stretch	to	political,	economic,	institutional	and	organisational	turbulence,	provoking	both	utopianism	and	anxiety	and	fear,	as	the	enormity	of	the	impact	on	individuals,	organisations,	institutions	and	nations	starts	to	unfold.	The	Brexit	vote	can	be	seen	as	a	‘moment	of	suspended	disbelief’,	creating	a	discontinuity	where	previous	norms	and	rules	of	engagement	no	longer	automatically	apply,	and	where	earlier	accepted	values	and	practices	are	up	for	negotiation	(Guldi,	2016).	Britain	is	poised	in	the	balance	between	a	multiplicity	of	conflicting	and	competing	futures	–	ranging	from	the	restoration	of	welfare	state	as	advocated	by	the	Labour	Party	Leader,	Jeremy	Corbyn,	to	further	neoliberalisation,	darker,	more	dystopian	scenarios	(such	as	the	rise	of	the	far	right	to	new	dominance),	and	to	other,	potentially	yet	unimagined	possibilities	(ibid.).		Brexit	is	still	very	much	a	phenomenon-in-the-making	–	being	‘so	polyvalent	a	notion	and	so	complex	a	process	that	its	present	meaning	is	hard	to	define	and	its	future	trajectory	hard	to	discern’	(Jessop,	2016:7).	As	a	conflicted	and	continuously	evolving	assemblage	of	politically	incongruous	allies	and	interests,	it	is	a	daily	study	in	the	complexities	of	radical	change,	the	organisation	and	disorganisation	of	politics,	and	the	political	nature	of	organising	and	disorganising.	With	the	questions	of	the	unity	of	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	continuation	of	the	EU	very	much	on	the	agenda,	Brexit	is	also	undeniably	a	phenomenon	of	global	significance	(Galbraith,	2016;	Patomäki,	2016;	Wahl,	2016).		Despite	the	multiplicity	of	political	motivations	driving	it,	Brexit	has	been	widely	reported	to	have	given	a	boost	to	populist	parties	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	and	contributed	to	the	Trump	vote	in	the	US	presidential	election	on	the	8th	of	November	2016.	Along	with	‘Trumpism’,	Brexit	has	been	interpreted	as	the	first	stark	evidence	to	the	claim	that	Europe	and	USA	are	now	under	an	unprecedented	sway	of	a	new,	‘heritage’	form	of	right-wing	populism	(Reynié,	2016).	This	new	form	of	populism	is	said	to	emphasise	the	nativist	preservation	of	material	and	cultural	heritage	and	is	characterised	by	‘unbridled	demagoguery,	xenophobia,	condemnation	of	the	elite,	and	stigmatizing	rhetoric’	(Reynié,	2016:	48).	It	exploits	and	is	fuelled	by	anger	and	anxiety	of	those	most	disadvantaged	by	the	West’s	growing	economic	inequality	in	the	context	of	globalization	and	neoliberal	austerity	policies,	and	of	those	lashing	back	at	the	rapid	progressive	cultural	erosion	of	traditional	norms,	privileges	and	status	in	the	context	of	multiculturalism	and	liberalism	(Inglehart	and	Norris,	2016;	Zakaria,	2016).	As	right-wing	populist	parties	continue	to	gain	ground	within	and	beyond	Europe,	there	remains	a	foreboding	that	‘any	minute	now	we	could	be	living	in	a	very	different	world’	(Williams-Grut,	2016,	see	also	Giroux,	2016).	As	a	sign	of	its	times	as	well	as	a	radical	political	event	in	its	own	right,	Brexit	and	its	consequences	are	thus	in	need	of	urgent	critical	examination.	
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One	of	the	most	apparent	and	shocking	features	in	the	wake	of	the	Brexit	vote	has	been	the	surge	in	hatred	attacks,	including	those	engendering	racism,	xenophobia,	and	homophobia,	with	some	media	reporting	as	much	as	a	147%	rise	in	July,	August	and	September	2016	following	the	June	referendum	(Lusher,	2016).	Although	racism,	xenophobia	and	associated	behaviour	have	always	been	present	in	the	British	society,	Brexit	seems	to	have	legitimised	the	expression	of	belief	in	their	legitimacy	(Stewart,	2016),	showing	Britain	as	deeply	divided	along	the	lines	of	not	only	race	and	nationality,	but	also	age,	class,	education,	regional	differences	and	urbanisation	(Hobolt,	2016;	Toly,	2016;	Worth,	2016).	The	violence	unleashed	as	a	result	has	found	manifold	expression	on	British	streets,	public	transport,	social	media	and	in	workplaces	in	the	form	of	daily	written,	verbal	and	physical	abuse	of	those	looking	or	sounding	foreign,	and	in	more	serious	attacks,	including	the	brutal	murders	of	MP	Jo	Cox	and	Polish	worker	Arkadiusz	Jóźwik.	Conversely,	anti-racist	and	anti-hatred	campaigns	and	movements,	such	as	the	#SafetyPin	campaign,	the	Avaaz	‘Reject	Racism’	campaign	and	Not	Foreign	(which	has	collected	more	than	10,000	signatures	to	their	open	letter	to	the	Prime	Minister	calling	on	her	‘to	put	a	stop	to	her	government’s	bitter,	racist	and	divisive	language’)	point	to	the	consolidation	of	forces	rising	to	oppose	the	hatred	surge.	As	well	as	stirring	up	the	murky	waters	of	hatred,	Brexit	has	also	been	blamed	for	breeding	what	the	press	has	been	swift	to	describe	as	‘a	sinister	strain	of	anti-intellectualism’	(Wright,	2016).	The	role	of	experts	and	intellectuals	has	been	spurned	and	ridiculed	by	some	politicians	–	most	notoriously	when	as	part	of	the	Leave	campaign	Michael	Gove	was	reported	by	the	media	as	refusing	to	name	any	economists	supporting	Brexit,	stating	instead	that	‘people	in	this	country	have	had	enough	of	experts’	(Mance	2016).	Leading	figures	in	Brexit	debates,	and	especially	Leave	campaigners,	have	been	said	to	take	unprecedented	liberties	with	facts	in	general	and	referendum	promises	in	particular.	In	return,	the	anti-‘anti-science’	backlash	seems	to	have	been	quick	off	the	mark,	with	the	labels	of	‘postmodern	politics’	freely	attributed	to	the	Leave	campaign	and	the	government’s	management	of	Brexit,	along	with	accusations	of	denials	of	the	existence	of	‘objective	truth’	and	permitting	‘relativism	to	let	rip	and	damn	the	consequences’	(Wright,	2016).	The	editors	of	Oxford	Dictionaries	named	‘post-truth’	(‘relating	to	or	denoting	circumstances	in	which	objective	facts	are	less	influential	in	shaping	public	opinion	than	appeals	to	emotion	and	personal	belief’)	the	word	of	the	year	in	2016,	based	on	the	2,000%	surge	in	the	use	of	the	word	in	2016	compared	to	2015.	The	surge	peaked	around	the	EU	Referendum	and	the	US	presidential	election	(Flood,	2016).	Brexit	can	thus	be	understood	not	only	as	the	latest	flare-up	in	the	200-year	struggle	between	the	expert-led	state	rule	and	the	participatory	democracy	(Guldi,	2016),	but	also	arguably	as	the	latest	salvo	of	the	long-standing	‘science	wars’	(Sardar,	2000)	playing	out	in	the	broad	political	arena.	The	questions	over	the	legitimacy	and	relevance	of	experts	and	the	nature	of	their	knowledge	make	Brexit	a	core	concern	for	academics	in	terms	of	reflecting	on	our	own	knowledge,	practice,	impact	and	relevance.	Added	to	this	are	concerns	over	our	workplaces.	The	consequences	of	Brexit	for	UK	universities	are	manifold,	as	many	of	us	
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question	the	possibility	and	expediency	of	following	academic	careers	in	the	UK,	European	funding	starts	to	be	curtailed,	the	flow	of	European	students	starts	to	shrink,	and	European	academic	links	and	partnerships	become	harder	to	forge	(Cressey,	2017).	Yet,	as	academics,	we	face	the	challenging	task	of	not	only	living	and	working	through	Brexit,	but	also	making	sense	of	it	as	a	phenomenon,	of	influencing	policy	and	public	opinion	during	and	after	Brexit	negotiations,	and	of	questioning	and	reinventing	what	we	research	and	who	and	how	we	teach	in	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	times.	Fournier	and	Smith	(2012)	point	out	that	reward	systems	in	universities	discourage	academics	from	making	a	difference	in	the	wider	community	by	creating	a	conflict	between	public	and	individual	interests	and	privileging	the	latter.	So	in	addressing	Brexit	and	the	broader	phenomenon	of	populism	we	have	the	added	challenge	of	ensuring	that	the	imperative	to	protect	our	professional	interests	vested	in	academic	careers	in	local	HE	institutions	does	not	replace	the	need	for	a	broader	and	deeper	reimagining	of	our	practice	as	researchers	and	educators,	and	–	conversely	–	for	our	contribution	to	addressing	global	issues	in	which	we	are	seemingly	less	directly	implicated.	(The	latter,	we	might	add,	is	an	illusion	that	is	all	too	easily	maintained	(Dunne	et	al,	2008).)	
Brexit	and	CMS	For	CMS,	as	an	academic	community	that	studies	and	questions	many	of	the	root	problems	and	issues	surfaced	by	Brexit	in	relation	to	organising	and	organisations,	now	is	the	time	to	demonstrate	its	own	worth.	Armed	with	its	long-honed	theoretical	tools	(e.g.	theories	of	leadership,	change,	power,	resistance,	race	and	class),	critical	methodologies	and	epistemologies,	as	well	as	developed	critiques	of	elites,	neoliberalism,	market	fundamentalism,	managerialism	and	economic	inequalities,	CMS	is	potentially	well-prepared	to	confront	the	organisational	and	societal	aspects	of	Brexit,	its	impact	on	working	lives,	and	its	implications	for	the	role	of	researchers,	educators	and	intellectuals.	Now	is	the	time	to	put	these	arms	to	the	test	in	the	context	of	radical	political	upheaval	in	order	to	establish	what	can	help	to	foster	constructive	debate,	challenge	deep	underlying	racism,	class,	regional	and	other	tensions,	and	dissipate	the	damaging	effects	of	Brexit	whilst	helping	to	grasp	the	moment	of	potentialities	it	represents	for	building	alternative	futures	and	societies.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	also	time	to	examine	what	within	our	intellectual	arsenal	is	found	wanting,	or,	indeed,	absent.	This	is	a	particularly	worthwhile	task	as	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	trade	deals	negotiations	could	go	on	for	a	decade	(Elgot	et	al,	2016)	and	therefore	are	likely	to	be	impacting	professional	and	personal	lives	both	within	and	outside	the	UK	for	a	very	long	time.	This	also	gives	CMS	time	and	opportunity	to	contribute	to	policy	development	moving	forward.	Confronting	Brexit	would,	however,	require	confronting	CMS	itself	in	some	rather	fundamental	ways.	As	Tatli	(2012)	writes,	CMS	specializes	in	spotting	and	challenging	exclusion	and	privilege	in	management	and	organising	at	large,	but	is	often	blind	to	the	pervasive	inequality,	homogeneity	and	exclusion	within	its	own	ranks.	This,	in	turn,	sabotages	its	critical	potential,	for	‘how	can	a	community	which	is	characterized	by	the	
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numerical	and	hierarchical	domination	of	the	privileged	segments	of	society	provide	alternatives	for	the	disadvantaged	and	oppressed?’	(Tatli,	2012:	26).	Tatli’s	argument	is	now	particularly	poignant	in	the	context	in	which	the	disadvantaged	and	oppressed	have	apparently	had	enough	of	(academic)	experts	who	are	likely	to	be	seen	as	part	of	the	oppressing	and	uncaring	elite.	To	demonstrate	its	relevance	in	the	context	of	Brexit	and	rising	heritage	populism,	it	is	therefore	vital	that	CMS	learns	to	apply	the	same	critical	scrutiny	to	ourselves	as	we	do	to	others,	and	to	act	on	such	critical	reflection	to	instill	diversity	and	inclusion	within	our	own	community.	This	links	to	the	broader	need	for	CMS	to	become	more	thorough	and	inventive	about	bridging	the	distance	between	itself	and	the	disenfranchised	whose	interests	it	purports	to	support.		It	is	not	just	the	elitism	and	exclusivity	of	CMS	that	are	problematic	in	light	of	this	need.	The	political,	intellectual	and	practical	focus	of	CMS	requires	re-examining	and	refining	too.		Back	in	2008,	in	a	Speaking	Out	issue	of	this	journal	on	the	future	of	CMS,	Stookey	wrote	about	the	tension	between	the	elitism	inherent	in	CMS	(and	which	‘reserves	authority	for	those	individuals	and	groups	with	special	attributes,	for	that	which	is	specifically	not	common’)	and	the	CMS	scholars’	populist	affinities	–	i.e.	the	privileging	within	CMS	of	‘the	characteristics,	interests,	ideas	and	leadership	of	the	majority’.	Stookey	called	on	CMS-ers	to	denounce	eliticism	whilst	openly	acknowledging	its	inevitable	role	in	the	CMS’	populist	project,	arguing	that	no	meaningful	change	was	possible	‘unless	guided	by	the	common	experience	of	the	majority’	(Stookey,	2008).	Ten	years	on,	the	darker	aspects	of	Brexit	have	cast	the	entanglement	between	CMS,	populism	and	elitism	in	a	new	dour	light.	The	surge	of	hatred	and	xenophobia	are	a	poignant	reminder	of	populism’s	ugly	side,	that	‘meaningful	change	guided	by	common	experience’	does	not	necessarily	mean	change	for	the	better,	and	that	privileging	the	interests	and	ideals	of	the	majority	(even	if	this	were	feasible	in	the	case	of	Brexit,	where	‘majority’	and	its	motivations	are	so	loosely	defined	and	demographically	complex)	comes	with	the	long	historical	shadow	of	too	high	a	price	too	often	paid	by	the	minorities	whose	interests	and	ideas	are	thereby	excluded.		In	this	new	light,	CMS	needs	to	question	and	reexamine	its	populist	affinities.	This	would	involve	asking	whether	it	is	indeed	the	majority	interests	that	we	wish	to	support	and	further	through	our	work,	or	whether	there	are	better	ways	of	focusing	the	energies.	We	come	back	to	this	point	later	on	in	the	paper.	The	relationship	between	CMS	and	populism	needs	to	be	reexamined	especially	as,	in	bringing	to	the	surface	the	mistrust	and	questioning	of	the	elites,	neoliberalism,	market	fundamentalism	and	globalization,	Brexit	has	both,	in	a	way,	embodied	aspects	of	CMS	critique	and	sabotaged	it.	It	has	done	the	latter	not	least	through	the	questioning	of	the	relevance	of	the	academic	elite	and	expertise	on	which	CMS	draws	for	legitimacy.	It	is	therefore	also	the	time	to	revisit	and	reassess	the	question	of	the	relevance	of	CMS	and	its	impact	on	the	broader	populace	it	aspires	to	serve.		CMS	communities	should	be	well	prepared	for	such	self-examination	due	to	their	long-standing	claims	to	reflexivity	and	debates	over	their	relevance	to	practitioners.	Since	
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the	turn	of	the	millennium,	such	debates	have	been	framed	mostly	in	terms	of	different	key	positions	in	relation	to	the	notion	of	performativity	–	including,	specifically,	anti-performativity	(Fournier	and	Grey,	2000),	critical	or	progressive	performativity	(Spicer	et	al,	2009;	Alvesson	and	Spicer,	2012;	Spicer	et	al,	2016;	Wickert	and	Schaefer,	2015),	and	political	performativity	(Cabantous	et	al,	2016).	More	recently,	they	have	also	been	framed	as	calls	for	a	more	public	CMS	(Fleming	and	Banerjee,	2016;	Delbridge,	2014),	engaged	scholarship	(Cunliffe	and	Scaratti,	2017)	and	intellectual/academic	activism	(Contu,	2017;	Pritchard	and	Benschop,	2017;	Rhoades	et	al,	2017).		Below,	we	therefore	take	these	positions	as	a	starting	point	for	thinking	about	the	potential	relevance	of	CMS	in	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	contexts.	We	reflect	on	the	potential	and	the	challenges	associated	with	each	position,	and	argue	that	there	is	a	need	for	a	new	public	CMS,	which	would	1)	be	guided	by	the	premise	that	we	have	no	greater	and	no	lesser	right	than	anyone	else	to	shape	the	world,	2)	entail	as	much	critical	reflexivity	in	relation	to	our	unintended	performativities	as	our	intended	ones,	and	3)	be	underpinned	by	marginalism	as	a	critical	political	project.	
Anti-performativity	The	anti-performative	(or	non-performative)	stance,	put	forward	by	Fournier	and	Grey	(2000)	as	one	of	the	key	features	that	unifies	diverse	CMS	endeavors,	is	about	questioning	the	managerialist	subordination	of	knowledge,	research	and	learning	to	the	goals	of	economic	efficiency.	It	is	also	about	challenging	the	mainstream	assumption	that	the	purpose	of	management	research	and	education	is	to	contribute	to	the	effectiveness	of	managerial	practice.	As	‘opposition	to	forms	of	knowledge	exclusively	serving	economic	efficiency’	(Cabantous	et	al,	2016:	200),	anti-performativity	is	in	some	ways	aligned	with	the	spirit	of	heritage	populism	that	openly	disdains	economic	expertise	and	facts.	This	alignment	arguably	presents	CMS	with	an	opportunity	to	inform	the	efforts	to	denaturalize	and	deconstruct	old	institutions	of	inequality	and	repression	in	the	process	of	Brexit.	Anti-performativity	can	also	be	instrumental	in	making	sense	of	how	Brexit	and	its	consequences	came	about,	through	analysis	of	the	alienation	and	disenchantment	of	segments	of	the	populace	with	the	dehumanizing	tyranny	of	neoliberal	economic	fundamentalism.	Furthermore,	with	its	inherent	anti-managerialism,	anti-performativity	can	act	as	a	timely	imperative	‘to	free	the	notion	of	[CMS]	engagement	from	the	straightjacket	within	which	it	has	become	trapped	by	debates	promoting	or	refusing	dialogue	with	managers,	and	re-imagine	engagement	in	terms	of	a	broader	organizational	constituency’	(Fournier	and	Grey,	2000:	27).	On	the	other	hand,	as	populism	rises	to	dominance,	anti-performativity	is	in	danger	of	becoming	abused	as	a	discursive	weapon	in	the	arsenal	of	the	powerful.	The	notion	of	‘anti-establishment’	(repurposed	in	relation	to	heritage	populism)	suddenly,	ironically,	threatens	to	become	an	establishment	itself,	and	acquires	darker	and	more	menacing	undertones.	The	CMS	‘anti-‘focus	–	the	vector	of	its	critique	–	on	economic	performativity,	whilst	valuable,	potentially	risks	becoming	too	narrow	to	grapple	with	the	organisational	complexities	in	the	wake	of	this	political	change.		
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Critical	or	Progressive	Performativity	The	assertion	that	CMS	should	be	profoundly	performative,	in	the	sense	of	having	as	its	central	task	active	and	pragmatic	intervention	in	specific	debates	about	management	and	encouraging	progressive	forms	of	management	(Spicer	et	al,	2009),	arguably	fits	rather	comfortably	with	the	idea	that	CMS	should	be	actively	contributing	to	the	efforts	to	re-organise	and	repair	during	and	after	Brexit.	Moreover,	as	a	rapidly	evolving	set	of	‘unresolved	issues,	challenges,	contentions	or	concerns	that	exist	but	are	not	clearly	articulated’	(Spicer	et	al,	2016:	234),	that	are	of	utmost	public	importance	and	in	urgent	need	of	reflexive	questioning,	Brexit	constitutes	an	ideal	arena	for	putting	the	full	capacity	of	critical	performativity	to	the	test.	More	specifically,	where	it	‘involves	CMS	becoming	affirmative,	caring,	pragmatic,	potential	focused,	and	normative’	(Spicer	et	al,	2009:	537),	critical	performativity	offers	an	opportunity	to	address	and	mitigate	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	organisations,	and	help	to	shape	organisational	reactions	to	Brexit	and	their	consequences.	This	could	involve	working	constructively	with	individuals	and	groups	within	both	commercial	and	non-commercial	organisations	(such	as	the	Chartered	Institute	of	Personnel	and	Developmenti	and	trade	unions)	to	help	dissipate	Brexit-related	tensions	in	the	workplace,	address	emotions	at	work,	and	actively	challenge	racism,	xenophobia,	and	homophobia	(for	example	by	questioning	underlying	assumptions	about	the	role	of	immigrant	labour	or	other	minorities	in	organisations).	Such	engagement	could	emphasise	a	role	not	only	for	engaged	scholarship	but	also	for	critical	management	education	that	extends	beyond	the	classroom.	In	this,	CMS-ers	could	make	use	of	specific	tactics	associated	with	critical	performativity	–	in	particular,	searching	for	potentialities	in	the	present	context	(Alvesson	and	Spicer,	2012),	engaging	with	non-academic	groups	using	dialectical	reasoning,	scaling	up	insights	through	movement	building,	and	propagating	deliberation	(Spicer	et	al,	2016)	–	in	order	to	reclaim	relevance	at	a	time	when	detached	academic	expertise	is	increasingly	undermined.		To	make	the	most	of	these	possibilities,	however,	the	limitations	of	critical	performativity	must	be	reflected	on	and	confronted.	For	example,	its	goals	of	micro-emancipation	and	micro-engagement	‘to	induce	incremental,	rather	than	radical,	changes	in	managerial	behaviour’	(Wickert	and	Schaefer,	2015:	107)	–	the	goals	that	may	work	their	slow	effects	well	in	times	of	relative	stability,	may	prove	hopelessly	unresponsive	and	inadequate	in	the	context	of	radical	political	events	(Fleming	and	Banerjee,	2016).	Furthermore,	the	emphasis	of	critical	performativity	on	the	process	of	‘reflexive	conscientization’	that	aims	to	slowly	raise	the	critical	consciousness	of	practitioners	(Wickert	and	Schaefer,	2015)	may	require	reimagining	or	at	least	refining	in	a	situation	where	the	lack	of	critical	consciousness	is	not	necessarily	the	problem.	Rather,	on	whatever	side	individual	CMS-ers	find	themselves	in	the	context	that	exacerbates	and	normalizes	explicit	political	tensions,	the	question	may	now	be	at	least	as	much	about	the	means	and	the	ethics	of	dealing	with	the	critical	consciousness	of	those	we	attempt	to	emancipate.	The	question	is	especially	pressing	when	that	critical	consciousness	is	decidedly	at	odds	and	perhaps	even	openly	hostile	to	our	own,	and	
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bent	upon	a	course	that	we	see	as	destruction	of	our	own	deeply	held	beliefs,	such	as	those	of	equality,	pluralism	and	openness.	In	this	light,	it	needs	to	be	acknowledged	that	even	the	term	‘progressive’	may	now	provoke	additional	hostility	in	more	than	one	way	due	to	its	resonances	with	the	political	defeats	of	the	progressive	liberal	side.		
Political	Performativity	Political	theory	of	performativity	–	aka	political	performativity	–	was	developed	to	‘provide	an	alternative	reading	of	performativity	that	better	enables	efforts	to	take	on	the	issues’	that	critical	performativity	aims	to	address	(Cabantous	et	al,	2016:	198).	In	the	light	(and	darkness)	of	Brexit,	the	core	strength	of	this	position	is	its	explicit	emphasis	on	performativity	as	necessitating	engagement	with	power	and	politics	that	are	both	embodied	in	and	transcend	organisations,	as	well	as	its	engagement	with	subjectivities,	identities,	and	socio-material	arrangements	that	both	constitute	and	are	constituted	within	the	broader	networks	of	power	(Cabantous	et	al,	2016).	Political	performativity	thus	offers	CMS	an	opportunity	to	respond	more	fully	to	the	context	in	which	‘big	P’	Politics	comes	to	radically	disrupt	and	rearrange	organizational	practices	and	working	lives.	In	this	context,	political	performativity	can	be	put	to	work	to	examine	how	new	subjects	and	identities	(e.g.	‘Brexiteers’,	‘Brexiters’,	‘Remainers’,	‘Lexiteers’)	are	constituted	as	part	of	Brexit,	how	subjects	and	identities	are	questioned	and	reworked	(e.g.	‘experts’,	‘intellectuals’,	‘academics’),	how	the	othering	of	groups	that	come	to	be	the	objects	of	the	hatred	surge	(e.g.	‘immigrants’)	takes	place.	Political	performativity	has	the	potential	to	encourage	CMS-ers	to	expand	their	focus	to	examine	organisations	and	workplaces	as	parts	of	the	wider	socio-material	networks	constituting	and	being	re-constituted	by	Brexit.	This	would	involve	paying	attention	not	only	to	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	organisations,	but	also	to	the	role	of	organisations	and	organising	in	shaping	Brexit	and	its	consequences.	More	broadly,	it	would	involve	investigating	the	role	of	the	wide	range	of	organisations,	institutions,	social	movements	and	individuals	(e.g.	media	and	social	media,	financial	institutions,	local,	national	and	supranational	governments,	NGOs,	political	and	business	leaders	(Grint,	2016),	think	tanks,	universities,	academics)	in	shaping	and/or	failing	to	shape	popular	and	political	opinion	underpinning	heritage	populism	and	its	alternatives.	The	stance	of	political	performativity	would	foster	the	view	of	CMS	and	CMS	scholars	as	actors	among	many	in	these	wider	networks	of	power,	and	thus	as	possessing	no	greater	nor	lesser	a	priori	entitlement	to	influence	and	impact	the	socio-material	arrangements	of	which	they	are	part	than	anyone	else.	
New	public	CMS,	unintended	performativity,	and	marginalism	The	‘no	greater	nor	lesser’	qualifier	is	important.	From	the	position	of	assumed	elitism	and	expertise,	the	‘no	greater’	aspect	may	seem	(to	an	academic)	a	degrading	thought,	but	we	would	suggest	that	it	is	otherwise	merely	a	sobering	one	–	a	reminder	that	CMS	should	claim	no	higher	ground	to	address	problems	and	shape	society	in	post-Brexit	context.	Too	much	discussion	of	CMS	performativity	seems	to	assume	a	privileged	
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intellectual	and	moral	right	of	critical	scholars	to	intervene	or	at	least	critique	managerial	and	organisational	practice.	Yet	the	recent	events	have	demonstrated	very	clearly	that	the	world	is	not	waiting	with	baited	breath	to	hear	and	act	on	academic	utterances.	Instead,	it	is	up	to	us	to	earn	and	maintain	the	pragmatic	and	contingent	right	to	change	and	impact	–	in	the	more	meaningful	sense	of	developing	a	‘public	CMS’	(Fleming	and	Banerjee,	2016)	perhaps	enabled	by	organic	public	sociology	(Brook	and	Darlington,	2013)	and	new	public	social	science	(Delbridge,	2014)	rather	than	its	stripped-down,	economic	efficiency-driven	version	propagated	by	the	managerialist	Higher	Education.	Such	right	needs	to	be	earned	by	not	only	having	something	worthwhile	to	say	and	do,	but	also	by	speaking	and	acting	in	ways	that	are	convincing,	interesting	and	engaging	to	audiences	that	are	‘not	likely	to	come	to	the	sermon,	much	less	be	a	part	of	the	choir’	(Perrow,	2008:	915).	Although	we	would	not	advocate	writing	for	The	Daily	Mail,ii	we	see	an	urgent	need	to	rework	CMS’	engagement	with	politics,	policy	and	community,	whilst	continuing	to	develop	and	enact	critical	scholarship	and	education.		There	is	already	much	we	can	draw	on	–	both	within	CMS	and	in	the	wider	social	sciences	–	to	develop	this	agenda.	This	would	include,	firstly,	rediscovering	and	reasserting	the	power	of	education	as	activism	(Contu,	2009;	Delbridge,	2014)	whilst	becoming	more	inventive	about	how	we	take	critical	education	to	those	who	are	unlikely	to	become	managers	(perhaps	learning	from	1950s-60s	British	Marxist	historians	and	others,	who	taught	adult	education,	enabled	by	trade	unions	and	other	institutional	actors).	It	would	also	include	developing	a	more	extensive	arsenal	of	engaged	research	methodologies	aimed	at	producing	socially	useful	knowledge,	in	which	researchers	act	not	as	detached	‘experts’	but	as	dialogue	facilitators	between	practitioners	(Cunliffe	and	Scaratti,	2017).	To	engage	with	the	rise	and	effects	of	heritage	populism,	we	could	learn	from	past	research	into	similar	phenomena	–	for	example,	1980s	sociological	studies	of	Far	Right	communities,	where	researchers	took	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	those	directly	involved	in	such	movements	as	a	starting	point	for	critical	intervention	into	the	Far	Right	norms	and	assumptions.	More	broadly,	we	can	make	use	of	the	encouraging	new	work	on	intellectual/academic	activism	(Contu,	2017;	Rhodes	et	al,	2017)	and	new	spaces	in	which	it	can	be	made	visible	(including	the	Acting	Up	section	of	this	journal	(Pritchard	and	Benschop,	2017)).	Whatever	else	we	do,	we	would	need	to	reclaim	less	masculinized	versions	of	public	intellectualism,	with	the	aspiration	to	act	not	as	prominent	(or	dominant)	public	thinkers/experts	imposing	views	on	others	from	a	safe,	elevated	and	distant	position,	but	as	(embedded	and	embodied)	conduits	of	understanding	(Latin	intellectus)	–	interpreters,	questioners	–	within	and	between	communities.	The	‘no	greater	right’	element	is	a	reminder	that	any	importance	and	political	advantage	that	we	do	have	derives	from	our	connection	to	others.	In	crafting	such	links	we	construct	both	our	identities	and	influence,	yet	as	critical	scholars	we	should	be	mindful	of	the	‘strength	in	numbers’	adage	and	the	seduction	of	power.	We	must	choose	our	allies	carefully.		Whilst	it	may	be	tempting	and	even	seem	sensible	to	‘work	with	the	
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enemy’	in	order	to	be	critically	performative	(Delbridge,	2014;	Spicer	et	al,	2009),	we	should	be	very	careful	of	the	ways	in	which	our	engagement	with	those	in	positions	of	power	reproduces	the	very	power	structures	and	elites	we	wish	to	challenge	and	coopts	our	work	into	their	service.	This	raises	the	issue	of	unintended	performativity.	If	we	acknowledge	that	CMS	and	CMS	scholars	are	(inevitably)	actors	interacting	with	other	actors	within	socio-material	networks	of	power,	then	it	follows	that	each	action	we	take	results	in	some	sort	of	performativity	or	impact	on	others.	Even	if	all	we	ever	do	is	disseminate	ideas,	these	ideas	have	an	impact	and	a	fate	of	their	own	in	the	hands	of	other	people	around	us,	often	to	the	detriment	rather	than	benefit	of	others	(Dunne	et	al,	2008).	Consequently,	we	need	to	be	vigilant	about	and	ready	to	combat	our	unintended	performativity,	especially	where	CMS	work	becomes	misused	and	twisted.	To	put	it	differently,	a	new	public	CMS	should	be	radically	reflexive	not	only	about	the	public	good	it	aims	to	achieve	but	also	about	the	public	harm	it	needs	to	avoid	achieving.	One	case	in	point	is	of	the	notion	that	postmodernism	has	paved	the	way	for	post-truth	politics,	and	that	the	liberal	leftist	academia	should	therefore	acknowledge	its	‘shameful	part’	in	spawning	post-truth	and	its	consequences	(Calcutt,	2016).	As	a	home	for	non-mainstream	approaches,	including	postmodernism,	CMS	is	clearly	implicated	in	this	argument.	Yet	this	is	arguably	a	case	of	postmodernist	thought	twisted	in	the	service	of	heritage	populism.	For	example,	there	is	a	vast	difference	between	examining	and	questioning	the	power	dynamics	and	assumptions	sustaining	(dominant)	truth	claims	(something	for	which	postmodernism	is	very	useful)	and	the	post-truth	claims	that	(inconvenient)	facts	are	irrelevant.	There	is	therefore	intellectual	and	political	work	cut	out	for	CMS-ers	here	to	draw	out	the	differences	and	their	moral	consequences	(perhaps	even	applying	postmodernism	to	deconstruct	post-truth	as	an	emerging	grand-narrative!).	Returning	to	the	challenge	of	choosing	our	allies	carefully	and	the	issue	of	the	entanglement	of	CMS	scholars	with	populism	and	elitism,	we	suggest	that	marginalism	might	be	a	more	promising	direction	as	the	CMS	political	project.	Rather	than	pandering	to	the	wishes	of	the	majority,	heedless	of	whatever	its	stampede	might	leave	trampled	underfoot,	or	bowing	to	the	superiority	of	elites,	however	indifferent	they	may	be	to	the	fates	of	those	seen	as	insignificant,	marginalism	would	involve	a	responsibility	towards	the	underdog,	the	excluded,	the	forgotten.	It	would	involve	picking	up	the	pieces	of	what	has	been	washed	up,	broken	and	pitiful,	on	the	shore;	and	engaging	with	the	voices	too	quietly	dissonant	amidst	the	confident	choir	of	the	majority.	Here	we	could	take	inspiration	from	the	organic	public	sociology	and	strive	to	‘extend	and	deepen	our	organic	engagement	with	the	organized,	unorganized,	marginalized	and	unwaged,	whether	they	are	in	overt	struggle	or	searching	for	their	voices	to	be	heard,	as	a	first	step	in	pursuing	social	change’	(Brook	and	Darlington,	2013:	214).	Marginalism	would	also	mean	that	CMS	takes	up	a	permanently	relative,	semiotic	position,	always	directing	its	critique	against	the	dominant	vectors	of	power,	whichever	way	they	may	be	pushing	society.	A	change	in	the	direction	of	such	vectors	–	and	in	the	shape	of	the	margins	they	create	–	would	imply	a	corresponding	change	in	the	vectors	of	critique,	and	a	sensitive	
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search	for	the	new	marginalized.	The	underdogs	of	the	pre-Brexit	context	may	or	may	not	be	the	same	today,	and	this	needs	to	be	carefully	explored.	We	suggest	that	marginalism	would	mean	that	our	search	for	the	underdogs	should	also	guide	our	search	for	allies	–	in	other	words,	our	‘natural’	allies	should	be	those	on	the	margins	of	every	sphere,	organization,	location	and	walk	of	life.	Perhaps	we	should	start	by	looking	for	the	oppressed,	excluded	and	marginalized	within	our	own	ranks	and	ask	how	such	‘CMS	underdogs’	could	help	us	address	the	inequalities,	marginalization	and	exclusion	within	our	own	practices,	and	whether,	working	collaboratively,	they	would	be	willing	to	act	as	connections	to	those	whom	we	normally	struggle	to	reach	outside	academia.	In	the	broader	context,	we	should	also	learn	from	and	engage	with	emerging	resistances	–	for	instance,	social	movements	and	campaigning	organisations	like	Avaaz,	who	are	very	effective	at	identifying	social,	political	and	economic	problems	around	the	world	and	mobilizing	fast	response	action	through	a	combination	of	digital,	offline,	local	and	global	resources.	Conversely,	a	greater	challenge	could	be	to	dare	go	where	resistance	produces	its	own	social	injustice	–	where	the	oppressed	oppress,	and	marginalised	marginalize	others	(think	racism,	hatred	and	xenophobia	attacks	in	the	context	of	heritage	populism),	and	also	where	power	comes	so	close	to	domination	(in	Foucaldian	sense)	that	resistance	is	all	but	absent.	Whilst	finding	such	blind	spots	and	engaging	with	the	silent	voices	they	may	conceal	is	likely	to	be	difficult,	CMS	is	relatively	well-equipped	to	do	so	with	its	long-standing	work	on	different	forms	of	power	and	resistance,	and	approaches	for	focusing	on	the	hidden	dark	side	(e.g.	postmodernist	emphasis	on	the	absent	present).	From	the	marginalist	perspective,	the	really	challenging	aspect	would	be	to	ensure	that	our	configuration	of	allies	remains	dynamic	and	contingent	to	reflect	the	changing	power	relations	and	to	resist	the	temptation	to	settle	permanently	into	familiar	networks,	drifting	together	towards	more	comfortable	positions.	
Concluding	thoughts	The	‘no	lesser	right’	element	should	act	as	an	encouragement.	We	have	no	less	pre-given	right	and	no	less	a	priori	responsibility	to	speak	and	be	heard,	to	critique,	to	care,	to	feel,	to	uproot,	to	repair,	to	defend	and	to	change	than	anyone	else.	Our	hope	is	that	in	taking	up	this	right	and	responsibility	at	this	time	of	great	uncertainty	and	upheaval,	and	in	putting	to	the	test	thoughts	and	ideas	both	established	and	new,	CMS-ers	of	all	kinds	of	walks	and	persuasions	can	contribute	positively	to	shaping	Brexit	and	post-Brexit	worlds	in	academic	as	well	as	personal	capacities.	Given	the	global	nature	and	complexity	of	Brexit	and	heritage	populism	as	phenomena,	doing	so	is	likely	to	require	working	across	disciplines	and	geographical	locations,	and	diverse	contributions	–	including	new,	inventive	forms	–	from	different	kinds	of	academic,	scholarly,	political	and	practitioner	activities,	and	from	a	broad	range	of	approaches	and	methodologies.	It	is	likely	to	need	engaged,	public	critical	education	and	scholarship	enabled	by	broader	intellectual	activism	(Contu,	2017)	(with	awareness	of	our	intended	and	unintended	performativities),	including	active,	reflexive	engagement	with	both	traditional	and	
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social	media,	and	critical	contribution	to	policy	and	political	campaigns	(Brook	and	Darlington,	2013;	Fleming	and	Banerjee,	2016).	It	is	also	likely	to	need	a	critical	re-evaluation	of	a	number	of	long-standing	debates,	e.g.	about	post-industrial	society,	the	profit	imperative,	ecological	responsibility,	patriarchy,	feminism	and	masculinities,	symbolic	violence,	migration	and	work,	global	value	chains,	intellectual	pluralism,	equality	and	human	rights,	and	alternatives	to	populism	and	austerity.	Additionally,	it	would	also	require	an	ongoing	sponsorship	of	newly	emerging	debates	such	as	the	role	of	the	journalistic	field	and	social	media	in	populist	movements,	the	role	of	emotions	and	affect	in	research,	and	ongoing	work	on	developing	the	role	of	researchers	as	activists.	Such	effort	may	well	begin	to	unfold	new	forms	of	public	performativity.	Brexit	is	a	wake-up	call	–	we	hope	it	can	act	as	an	impetus	for	a	positive	transformative	change	within	and	beyond	CMS.		
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